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INTERSTATE RENDITION.

By HENRY S. BARKER.*
A Governor of a state to which a fugitive from justice has
fled has neither right nor authority to refuse to honor the requisition of the Governor of the state from whence the fugitive
fled, provided such requisition complies with the Constitution of
the United States and the statutes enacted by Congress for the
purpose of carrying the constitutional provision into effect.
Having been requested by the editor of this magazine to
contribute an article to its columns, I have chosen this subjectnot because it requires any deep erudition to illuminate its obscurity, but because such requisitions are so frequently refused
that it seems to me an exposition of what the Supreme Court has
adjudicated upon the subject is needed. I shall cite no authority
other than the opinions of the Supreme Court, as that tribunal
is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution, and its
opinions leave little or nothing new to be said.
It is a mere platitude to say that the Constitution is the
keystone of our government of federated states and that it fuses
them into a sovereign national government supreme in all matters delegated to it by the sovereign states. It declares itself
supreme and binding upon the consciences of all state officers;
its precise language is as follows:
"The Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme
7aw of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
"The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, 4nd all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states shall be bound
by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution."
(Article 6, subsecs. 1 and 2, Constitution.)

There was in the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution practically the same provision with reference to the re*Judge of the Common Pleas Branch, Third Division, Jefferson
Circuit Court.
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turn of fugitives from justice; indeed it is extremely doubtful if
the Constitution would have been accceded to by the states but
for the introduction of the provision in question.
The provision as to the extradition of fugitives from justice as contained in the Articles of Confederation is as follows:
"If any person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other
high misdemeanor in any state, shall flee from justice and be found
in any of the United States, he shall upon demand of the governor
or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up
and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offense."

The provision of the Constitution on the subject is:
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other
crime who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state
shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which
he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction
of the crime." (Subs. 2, Art. 2, Constitution.)

A companion provision, having relation to runaway slaves
"No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor
may be due. (Subsec. 3, Art. 4, Constitution.)

In order to enforce the provision of the Constitution as to
fugitives from justice, Congress on the twelfth day of February,
1793, enacted the following statute:
"Section 1. That whenever the executive authority of any state
in the union, or of either of the territories northeast or south of the
river Ohio, shall demand any person as a fugitive from justice of the
executive authority of any such state or territory to which such person shall have fled, and shall, moreover, produce the copy of an indictment found, or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any state
or territory as aforesaid, charging the person so demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by
the Governor or chief magistrate of the state or territory from whence
the person so charged fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which such person shall have fled
to cause him or her to 'be arrested and secured, and notice of the
arrest to 'be given to the executive authority making such demand,
or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and
to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear; but if no such agent shall appear within six months from the
time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. And all costs or
expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting
such fugitive, to the state or terriory making such demand shall be
paid by such state or territory.

We have now before us the whole law on the subject which
is treated of in this article. I have inserted the provision from
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the Articles of Confederation in order to show that from the
earliest inception of the idea of a permanent Union there existed
the fundamental desire that fugitives from justice should upon
proper demand be delivered up by the authorities of the State
where found, to those from whence they fled. I have inserted
the provision concerning fugitive slaves in order to illustrate
and account for the intense feeling which grew up between the
North and the South 'because of the growth of the anti-slavery
sentiment in the North and which tinctured the sentiment of the.
whole people on the subject of fugitives whether criminals orslaves.
The first case which relates to our subject is Prigg v. The:
Commnonwealih of Pennsylvania, 16' Peter, U. S. S. C. reports,.
page 539. Pennsylvania had a criminal statute punishing thekidnapping and carrying away of any persons for the purpose
of enslaving them. This statute was manifestly passed for theprotection of runaway slaves and doubtless had deterred many
an owner from seeking to carry back from Pennsylvania their
fugitive human property. At last one Edward Prigg seized in
Pennsylvania Margaret Morgan, a runaway slave from Maryland, and carried her back to Maryland and delivered her to her
owner, Margaret Ashmore. His act was undoubtedly in the
very teeth of the statute, and he was indicted, tried and convicted under it.
An appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
brought to that learned tribunal the question of the validity of
the Pennsylvania statute and along with it the question of the
power of a state to pass a penal law to prevent the owner from
seizing his fugitive slaves and carrying them 'back to the state
from whence they had fled. After a most learned argument, theCourt held that the Pennsylvania statute was void as contravening the Constitutional provision supra concerning fugitive slaves.
Mr. Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court but nearly
all of the Justices delivered separate opinions and in the light of
the flames of our Civil War we can read between the lines of'
the opinions of these Judges the sentiment which in less -than
twenty years was to precipitate our country into the fiercest war
the world up to that time had ever seen-a war which the Court
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did so much to bring about while most conscientously believing
they were settlifig the question of the extension of slavery finally
and forever. (Dred Scott Opinion, 19 Howard).
I cite the Prigg ease only as a part of the general judicial
question under discussion. It did not, of course, involve our
theme directly, but it throws a strong cross-light upon the whole
subject, for there is no practical difference between the principles of the two provisions, one authorizing a state to reclaim
its fugitive criminals and the other authorizing the master to
reclaim his fugitive slave. The fugitive slave law was the more
important of the two to the South and the opinion gave great
satisfaction to the Cotton States. The Court held squarely that
the master had an indisputable title to his runaway slave and
could recapture him wherever found and no statute was valid
which interfered with this right. The master's title was legalmost "iniquitously legal," it is true, 'but still legal-and the
master was satisfied.
At the December term of the Supreme Court in 1860 there
was decided in a unanimous opinion the great case of The Cammonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, Governor of Ohio, 24 Howard, page 66. This is the leading case on the subject of the extradition of fugitives from justice from one state of the Union
to those from whence they have fled. The salient facts are
these:
One Willis Lago, a freeman of color, was indioted, under a
statute of Kentucky, in the county of Woodford, for aiding and
abetting a female slave of a citizen of Kentucky to escape from
the possession of her master, etc, etc. A due and formal requisition was made by the Governor of Kentucky on the Governor of
Ohio for the extradition of the fugitive aigo who had fled to
Ohio. This requisition was refused by the Governor of Ohio,
whereupon the State xf Kentucky instituted an original action
in the Supreme Court to obtain a writ of mandamus against the
Governor of Ohio requiring him to honor the requisition of the
Governor of Kentucky. In this case several questions were raised:
First, the jurisdiction of -the Supreme Court to entertain
the action.
Second, that the indictment did not charge a common law
crime against Lago and therefore the requisition was unwarranted.
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Third, the granting cof the requisition was a matter of comity
and not of right.
The Court, after the most elaborate argument, held against
the Governor of Ohio on all the points in issue. It took jurisdiction of the suit; held that the crime charged, whether common
law or statutory, was sufficient to support a requisition; and
that the granting of the requisition was obligatory upon the defendant and that he had no right moral or legal, to refuse to
grant the requisition of the Governor of Kentucky. But I prefer to let the great Chief Justice (Taney) speak for himself by
quoting copiously from his opinion:
"Looking, therefore, to the words of the Constitution-to the obvious policy and necessity of this provision to preserve harmony between states, and order and law within their respective borders, and to
its early adoption by the colonies, and then by the Confederated
States, whose mutual interest it was- to give each other aid and .support whenever it was needed-the conclusion is irresistible, that this
compact engrafted in the Constitution included, and was intended
to include, every offense made punishable by the law of the state
in which it was committed, and that it gives the right to the executive authority of the state to demand the fugitive from the executive
authority of the state in which he is found; that the right given to
"demand" implies that it is an absolute right; and it follows that
there must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference
to the character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the
state to which the fugitive has fled.
"This is evidently the construction put upon this article in the
act of Congress of 1793, under which the proceedings now before us
are instituted. It is therefore the construction put upon it almost contemporaneously with the commencement of the government itself, and
when Washington was still at its head, and many of those who had
assisted in framing it were members of the Congress which enacted
the law."
On the subject of the Governor's discretion in the matter
of granting the requisition it is said:
"It is said in the argument, that the executive officer upon whom
this demand Is made must have a discretionary executive power, because he must inquire and decide who is the person demanded. But
this certainly is not a discretionary duty upon which he is to exercise
any judgment, but is a mere ministerial duty-that is, to do the act required to be done by him, and such as every marshal and sheriff must
perform when process, either criminal or civil, is placed in his hands
to be served on the person named in it. And it never has been supposed that this duty involved any discretionary power, or made him
anything more than a mere ministerial officer; and such is the position and character of the executive of the state under this law, when
the demand is made upon him and the requisite evidence produced.
The Governor has only to issue his warrant to an agent or officer to
arrest the party named in the demand.
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"The question which remains- to be examined is a grave and important one. When the demand was made, the proofs required by the
act of 1793 to support it were exhibited to the Governor of Ohio, duly
certified and authenticated; and the objection made to the validity
of the indictment is altogether untenable. Kentucky has an undoubted
right to regulate the forms of pleading and process in her own courts,
in criminal as well as civil cases, and is not bound to conform to those
of any other state. And whether the charge against Lago is legally
and sufficiently laid in this indictment according to the laws of Kentucky, is a judicial question to be decided by the courts of the state,
and not by the executive authority of the state of Ohio.

But the Court also held that under the Constitution it had
no power to coerce a Governor into doing his, duty, and for this
reason alone the mandamus was denied. The opinion in this
case has never been questioned or modified in any manner and it
remains today the chart for the conscientious action of all Chief
Executives whenever a requisition for the return of a fugitive
from justice is properly made.
The case of Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. Reports (Law Ed.), p.
432, arose in this way: Harry Thaw, who had been charged with
murder in New York, was adjudged to be insane and was committed to the Matteawan State Hospital for the Insane in New
York. From this institution he escaped into the State of New
Hampshire. A requisition for the fugitive was made by the
Governor of New York on the Governor of New Hampshire,
which was granted. A release of the fugitive was sought by
virtue of a habeas corpus proceeding in .the Federal Court and
finally reached the Supreme Court where the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes. I hope I have been able to set
forth the facts with sufficient perspicuity to enable the reader
to understand the principles of law laid down by the Court, but
the facts are not set forth with clarity or in sufficient detail
either by the reporter or in the opinion.
On the trial in the Supreme Court it was sought to show
that Thaw, having been adjudged insane, could not be guilty of
a crime. (He was charged with a criminal conspiracy to escape
from a lunatic asylum, an offense under the Statutes of New
York) There were other points raised and decided adversely
to Thaw but these, while interesting to the general student, have
no bearing upon the question under discussion. The opinion is
valuable to us now only insofar as it touches upon the subject
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in hand. As in the case of Kentucky v. Dennison, I shall permit
the learned Judge who wrote for the Court to tell the story in
his own words:
"We do not regard it as open to debate that the withdrawal, by
connivance, of a man from an insane asylum, to which he had been
committed as Thaw was, did tend to obstruct the due administration
of the law. At least, the New York courts may so decide. Therefore
the indictment charges a crime. If there is any remote defect in the
earlier proceedings by which Thaw was committed, which we are far
from intimating, this is not the time and place for that question to
be tried.
"If conspiracy constituted a crime there is no doubt that Thaw
is a fugitive from justice. He was a party to the crime in New York
and afterwards left the state. It long has been established that for
purposes of extradition between the states it does not matter what
motive induced the departure. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 226, 227. We perceive no ground
whatever for the suggestion that in a case like this there should be
a stricter rule.
"The most serious argument on behalf of Thaw is that if he was
insane when he contrived his escape he could not be guilty of crime,
while If he was not insane he was entitled to be discharged; and that
his confinement and other facts scattered through the record require
us to assume that he was insane. But this is not Thaw's trial. In
extradition proceedings, even when as here a humane opportunity is
afforded to test them upon habeas corpus, the purpose of the writ is
not to substitute the judgment of another tribunal upon the facts or
the law of the matter to be tried. The Constitution says nothing about
habeas corpus in this connection, but peremptorily requires that upon
proper demand the person charged shall be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. Article 4, 2.
Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 205. There is no discretion allowed,
no inquiry into motives. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 203. The technical sufficiency of the indictment is not open. Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364, 373. And even if
It be true that the agrument stated offers a nice question, it is a question as to the law of New York which the New York courts must decide. The statute that declares an act done by a lunatic not a crime
adds that a person is not excused from criminal liability except-upon
proof that at the time 'he was laboring under such defect of reason
as: 1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or 2. Not to know that the act was wrong.' Penal Law. 1120. See 34.
The Inmates of lunatic asylums are largely governed, it has been remarked, by appeal to the same motives that govern other men, and it
well might be that a man who was insane and dangerous, nevertheless In many directions understood the nature and quality of his acts
as well, and was as open to be affected by the motives of the criminal
law as anybody else. How far such considerations shall be taken into
account it Is for the New York courts to decide, as it is for a New
York jury to determine whether at the moment of the conspiracy Thaw
was insane in such sense as they may be instructed would make the
fact a defense. Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387, 405; Charlton v..Kelly,
229 U. S. 447, 462. When, as here, ilie identity of the person, the fact
that he is a fugitive from justice, the demand in due form, the indictment by a grand jury for what it and the Governor of New York allege
to be a crime in that state and the reasonable possibility that it may
be such, all appear, the constitutionally required surrender is not to
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be interfered with by the summary process of habeas corpus upon
speculations as to what ought to be the result of a trial in the place
where the Constitution provides for its taking place. We regard it as
too clear for lengthy discussion that Thaw should be delivered up at

once."

Now, mark what the learned Court decided. In such a case
if the offense charged is a crime in the demanding state it is immaterial whether it is so in the state where the fugitive is located
or not. "The Constitution says nothing about habeas corpus
but peremptorily requires that upon proper demand the person
charged shall be delivered up to the state having jurisdiction of
the crime." There is no discretion allowed, no inquiry into
motives. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 Howard 66. "The technical sufficiency of the indictment is not open." These opinions
leave nothing to be desired in the exposition of the Constitu,
tional provision. They leave no doubt as to the duty of a governor when the demand is made for the rendition of a fugitive.
The law is now so plain that, a wayfaring man though he be, a
governor shall not err therein.

